trenches a few minutes before Smith's onslaught. Porter's and Graves' cannoneers hkewise returned to their original emplacements, where they had iinlimhered their Once Colonel Tuttle had given the word, the rugged infantrymen of the 2d Iowa, deployed in doiible line of battle, took up the advance. As the ti-oops started forwiuxl, several officers glanced at their watches. It was a little past 2 p.m. With Colonel Tuttle at its head, the left battalion descended the timber covered eastern face of the hollow, which separated Smith's line of departure from the Confederate rifle pits crowning the opposite ridge. The right battahon led by Ceneral Smith and Colonel Baker followed about 150 yards in rear of the left wing. Company B, 25th Indiana, deployed as skirmishers, inadvertently took up the advance at the same time. The Hoosiers marced on the Hawkeyes' right.''"* Four of the five other regiments constituting Lauman's attacking force advanced en echelon on the right and on the left of the 2d Iowa. The 52d Indiana was on Tuttle's left. The 25th Indiana, the 7th and 14th Iowa were on his right. UnHke the 2d Iowa, which surged to the assault in line of battle, these four units mai-ched by the left flank. The shai-pshooters of the 14th Missouri guai'ded Lauman's ßanks."Ĉ rossing the small stream at tlie bottom of the hollow, the Iowans encountered a rail fence. It took the brawny Iowans only a few seconds to throw down the fence. Urged on by their popular colonel, the Hawkeyes began to ascend the opposite slope, the crest of which was crowned by the Confederate rifle pits. "Steady, boys!" shouted Tuttle.
"Steady, boys!" the officers repeated. The Iowans now entered the abatis which fronted the Rebel earthworks. Although no one gave the order, the regiment quickened its pace. Scrambling over felled timber and tlu'ough brush, the grim Hawkeyes pushed steadily up the lull, their flxed bayonets ghstening."" 03 Ibid., [344] [345] 348. 350, 354, 357. «4 Ibid., [228] [229] On the Hawkeyes' left and right, the supporting regiments waded tlie small watercourse and entered the abatis. When their colors reached tlie bottom of the hollow, two of the four regimental commanders sent their men up the opposite sloj^e in columns of battalions. After crossing tlie stream, Colonel Veatch halted liis lead battalion, pending the aiTival of the other. As soon as liis second battalion came up, the colonel formed his unit, the 25th Indiana, into line of battle. The regiment staited up the hill on the run, The commander of the 14tli Iowa, Colonel William T. Shaw, deployed liis left battalion into Hne of battle. His right battalion marched up the left flank.sT
Observing the Union buildup on the opposite ridge, Major Turner, whose small command of three companies was charged with the defense of the detached rifle pits, shouted for his officers "to keep a careful watch." A httle after 2 p.m. Captain Carson informed the major "that the Federals were moving on the works in lai'ge numbers." Mounting his horse, Tm-ner rode to his left. Here, there was a commanding knoll from which he could survey the entii-e area. Froni this point, the major "could see the enemy in two lines, and numbering several thousand, moving rapidly upon us." Rejoining his small command. Turner ordered his troops into position. He admonî shed his soldiers "to hold their fire until the enemy were at close range." At tliis moment. Turner was cheered to see the advance elements of Colonel Hanson's crack 2d Kentucky rapidly approaching. Calloping toward the oncoming reinforcements. Turner hailed Hanson who was riding with his regiment's van, and asked for help. Without taking time to reply, Hanson bellowed out the command "double-quick time march!' But, by the time Htmson's gasping infantrymen reached the point of danger, the Federals had driven their attack home."**
The left battalion of the 2d Iowa, with Tuttle at its head, surged rapidly forward "in unbroken line," without firing a shot. Not until the Hawkeyes had driven to within 20 paces of the rifie pits, held by Turner's Tennesseeans, did they encounter any small-arms fire. Captain Newsham, who was lid- Large gaps were ripped in Tuttle's initial assault wave by this point-blank fire. But it was like trying to sweep back the tide with a broom as the Iowans closed in for the kill. As soon as he reached the open ground in front of the Rebel rifle pits, Tuttle shouted, "Right over boys!" With a cheer, the Hawkeyes poured over the works and found tliat most of Turner's men had taken to their heels. The few Tennesseeaiis who remained behind "were promptly put to the bayonet."'Ĥ aving scored a breaktlirough, Tuttle ordered his soldiers to blaze away at the fleeing Tennesseeans. The Iowans responded to this command with enthusiasm. Several volleys had been discharged into the fleeing greyclads before Colonel Baker's panting battalion, headed by General Smith, reached the captured works. Company B, 25th Indiana had kept abreast of Tuttle's wing. The Hoosiers gained the rifle pits a little to the right of the Hawkeyes' point of peneti ation. Even before the Iowans had caught theii" second wind, General Smith, in hopes of exploiting his success, called upon Tuttle to redeploy his regiment and press on. In accordance with the general's instiaictions, Tuttle quickly reformed the 2d Iowa into line of battle.'^-The other units of Launian's attacking brigade reached the captin-ed rifle pits close on the Iowan's heels. On Tuttle's left, the 2d Indiana came up. Because of the rugged terrain over which the regiment had advanced, and the "want of tactical" know-how demonsti-ated by the officers of the recently organized regiment, the Hoosiers reached tlie Confederate works in "confusion." Nevertheless, Smith ordered tlie Indianians to support the 2d Iowa as the Hawkeyes pressed after the fleeing Tennesseeans.'T he 25th Indiana, after having been deployed into line of battle, had veered to the left. The regiment, except for Company B, entered the Rebels' works at the point where the 2d Iowa had planted its colors. Upon gaining the earthworks, the regiment was instructed by General Smith to support the advance of the 2d Iowa.^* To the Hoosiers' right, the 7th and 14th Iowa entered the entrenchments. Apparently only one of these regiments, the 7th Iowa, pressed after the repeating Confederates. By the time these hvo regiments reached the abandoned rifle pits. Porter's Tennessee Battery had commenced to hammer the area with canister and shell. In addition, the infantrymen of the 18th Tennessee, from their position atop a commanding knoll several hundred yards southwest of the breakthi-ough, had opened fire on the two Iowa regiments. General Smitli was afraid that tliis might foreshadow a Rebel counterattack on the exposed right flank of Lauman's brigade. The general accordingly directed the commander of the 14th Iowa, Golonel Shaw, to have his unit hold and defend the western portion of the captmed rifle « Ibid. pits.'S The 14th Missouri continued to cover the Hanks of Lauman's brigade.
As soon as tlie rifle pits were secured. General Smith called for Captain Newsham. The general ordered the captain to hasten to tlie rear and bring forwaixl a section of artillery. These guns would be emplaced in the captured works. From this vantage point, the field pieces would be used to support the attack on tlie new lhie of resistance which tlie Confederates were frantically seeking to establish on the next ridge, 400 yards to the east. Hunying to the rear, Captam Newsham quickly contacted the officer in charge of Battery K, Captain George H. Stone.
The captain, on being advised tliat artillery was needed at the front, issued marching orders to Lieutenant John O Connell's section. In spite of the difficult teirain, O'ConnelFs gunners succeeded in bringi:ig theii-two 10-pounder Parrotts foi-ward. Caining the captured position, tlae Missourians quickly mihmbered their pieces and opened fire. After the artillerists had placed their Parrotts in batteiy, Colonel Shaw "5 Ibid., 231-232; O.K., Series I, Vol. LII, pt. I, 9-10. Lew Wallace in his article published in Battles and Leaders wrote of the attack in highly colored terms: Taking Lauman's brigade. General Smitli began the advance. They were under fire instantly. The guns in die fort joined in witli the inhmtry who were at the time in the rifle-pits, the great body of tlie Confederate right wing being witli General Buckner. The defense was greatly favored by the ground, which subjected the assailants to a double fire from the beginning of the abatis. The men have said that "it looked too thick for a rabbit to get through." General Smith, on lus horse, took position in the front and center of the line. Occasionally he turned in the saddle to see how the alignment was kept. For the most part, however, he held liis face steadily toward tlie enemy. He was, of course, a conspicuous object for the sharp-shooters in die rifle-pits. The air around liim tvidttered with minie-buUets. Erect as if on review, he rode on timing ' the gait of liis horse with the movement of his colors. A soldier said: "I was nearly scared to death, but I saw tJie old mans wliite mustache over his shoulder, and went on." On to the abatis the regiments moved without hesitation, leaving a trail of dead and wounded behind. There the fire seemed to get trebly hot, and there some of tlie men halted, where upon, seeing the Jiesitation, General Smidi put his cap on the point of his sword, held it aloft, and called out. No flinching now, my lads?-Here-this is the wayl Gome onl He pieked a padi through the jagged limbs of the trees holding liis cap all die time in sight; and tJie effect was magical. The men swarmed in after liim, and got tlirough in die best order they could-not all of them, alas! On the other side of the obstruction they took the semblance of re-formation and redeployed his regiment, the 14th Iowa. Shaw did this with a two-fold objective in mind; to get his troops under cover and to furnish support to the cannoneers.^o * » » When their volleys failed to check Tuttle's hai'd-hitting Iowans, a number of Turner's men abandoned theii-comiades and drifted to the rear. A large portion of Captain Carson's and Sample's companies grimly held tlieir ground. These soldiers contested "the ground with a courage," Major Tm-ner had "never seen sin-passed." Overwhelmed by the Hawkeyes, the badly outnumbered Tennesseeans, leaving behind their dead and seriously wounded, rapidly retreated across the deep hollow to the reai-of tlieir rifle pits. Reaching the crest of the opposite ridge 400 yards to the east. Major Tmner rallied his tliree companies. Aided by Colonel Head who had hastened to the point of danger. Turner quickly deployed his troops behind the topographic crest of the ridge."'
The Yankees had scored their breakthrough before Hanson's charged in after their cliief, who found himself then between the two fires. Up the ascent he rode; up they followed. At tlie last momenl: the keepers of the rifle-pits clambered out and fled. Wallace, "The Capture of Fort Donelson," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, I, 423. All the "After Action Reports" submitted by the participants agree on one point; tlic left wing of the 2d Iowa, led by Colonel Tuttle spearlieaded the Union attack. General Smith, Colonel Baker, and Captain Newsliam rode at the head of the right battalion of the 2d Iowa, wliich followed Tuttle's wing. Furthermore, the Confederates held their fire unUl the Iowans had driven to witliin 20 paces of the rifle pits; wlúlc tlie Federals did not use theh-fircanns imtil after they had crossed the earthworks.
The source for Wallace's account in Battles and Leaders, is probably the story submitted by the Missouri Democrat's correspondent datelined Fort Donelson, February 17, 1S62. The reporter wrote:
The hills at the point are among tlie most precipitous of those upon wliich the enciny were posted. Selecting tlie Second and Seventh Iowa, tlie Fifty-second Indiana for the storming party. Gen. Smitli deflected the main portion of his division to the right, and having succeeded in engaging the attention of the enemy at tliis point, himself headed tlie stoniiing party and advanced upon the works from liis extreme left. It was a most magificent sight. Unappalled by the perfect storm of bullets which rained about him, the General on horseback, and with lus hat on the point of his sword, iDreceded liis troops, and inspired them with furore there was no withstanding. Source Book, 773-774.
hard-fighting Kentuckians were able to reach the rille pits. When the bluecoats continued to press the attack, they caught the Kentuckians before they were able to complete their deployment. Hanson's regiment was dri\en back "in confiision" upon the rifle pits held by the 18th Tennessee. Here, Hanson, assisted by Ceneral Buckner, was able to rally his Kentuckians. Indeed, the Kentuckians had been thrown into such disorder that the two officers, to rally and form them, "had to take at least twenty men by the shoulders and pull them into line as a nucleus for formation. ' "** Buckner and Hanson had barely finished rallying the 2d Kentucky when Colonel Head rode up. Head quickly briefed the general on the desperate turn of events in his sector. Preparatory to bending his efforts to organize a new defense hne, Buckner sent several of his staff officers to hurry reiioforcements (both infantry and artillery) to the scene of the Union penetration. Next, the general, aided by a number of officers, hastily laid out a new line of resistance. Bucbier's new line was located beliind the topographic crest of the ridge and overlooked the spur where the detached works which the bluecoats had just captiired were located. The Confederates knew this position would have to be held. If the Unionists were able to emplace batteries on this ridge, they would make the Water Batteries and fort untenable.'" Colonel Head saw that the severe morning's fighting had "greatly exhausted" Buckner's command. He decided it would be a good idea if he committed a portion of the fort's giu-rison. A messenger was sent galloping to the fort with instructions for Colonel James E. Bailey to huiT>-the 49th Tennesse to Buckner's support. Moving out of the fort on the double, tlie 49th Tennessee, 300 strong, quickly covered the 800 yards which separated it from the point of danger where Buckner's new line was being formed. Colonel Bailey immediately deployed his regiment on the right of Turner's detachment. The 49th Tennessee had reached the front at a critical moment. As the soldiers dashed into position, they saw that the Union skirmishers (probably the 14th ^'Iissouri) had ahready crossed the ravine, and were nearly one-tliird of the way up the ridge. Bailey's men opened a scathing flre on the advancing bluecoats.«« Besides ordering out the 49th Tennessee, Colonel Head sought to strengthen Major Turner's detachment. Two companies of the 30th Tennessee had been manning the fortifications in the vicinity of the southwest salient angle. Following the return of Buckner's command, these two units found themselves unemployed. Advised of this situation. Head sent them to reinforce Major Turner. With the addition of tliese two companies. Turner found his command increased to a battalion. Four other companies, belonging to the 30th Tennessee, continued to occupy their battle stations in the rifle pits between the salient angle and Indian Creek."
Two of the three guns emplaced in the fort also opened fire on the attacking Federals. Finding that no gunboats were in range. Captain Reuben R. Ross left the Upper Battery. Accompanied by Ordnance Sergeant Stone and several otheimen attached to his batteiy, Ross took charge of one of the two nine-pounders emplaced in the fort. With this piece, the aitillerists "played on the enemy's land forces over the head" of their comrades, with what eflrect Ross "could not tell." Simultaneously, the crew manning the eight-inch siege howitzer commanded by Lieutenant P. K. Stankiewicz opened fire. Apparently, tlie siege gun was served with good effect, hesoibid., 378, 391-392. Lieutenant Golonel Alfred Robb was mortally wounded at tliis time. The 49th Tennessee's historian. Polk C. Johnson, recalled:
No braver or better soldier ever died. He [RobbJ went into the battle upon a large white horse, and being himself a very large man, was a fine target for the sharp-shooters. He was shot tlirough the breast by one of these, and when shot put liis hand to his breast, and saying he was shot, started to the rear. Severd men followed him, and he would have tallen from his horse in fift>' yards, but for their assistance.^ The men managed to get him to liis quarters. During the nignt he was carried to the boats at Dover to be sent to ClarksviUe with die other wounded. Two boats were at the wharf, one histened to the bank, and the other on the side ot this-boat. He was placed on the first boat to be carried through to Üie second; in crossing from the one boat to the other the boats separatedthe men holding liis legs let loose and his body feU into Üie river, and he would have been drowned had it not been for liis faithful old colored servant (Uncle Abram Robb) who holding his anus, pulled him into the boat. cause the guns spotters reported the shells falling into the target area.*T he five regiments of Colonel Brown's brigade were charged with the defense of the sector of the perimeter extending from the right flank of the 18th Tennessee to the knoll overlooking Indian Greek. Brown's troops had scarcely settled into position, before an excited staff officer galloped up to the colonel's command post. The aide informed Brown tliat Buckner needed both infantry and artilleiy to contain the Union breakthrough. Without a moment's hesitation, Golonel Brown issued orders for the 14th Mississippi, tlie 3d Tennessee, and a section of Graves' Kentucky Battery to hurry to Beckner's support. ^3
The nigged Mississippians, who had just reoccupied theii" position in support of Porter's six guns, moved off on the double, closely followed by the 3d Tennessee. These two regiments dashed up at a most opjoortime moment, because at this time the Federals had jiressed forward in a detennined effort to crush the Rebels' reorganized defense line. Buckner used tihese two regiments to plug a gap in liis line which existed between the 2d Kentucky's right and the left of Tiuner's battalion. The Mississippians were deployed to the right, the Tennesseeans to the left. The section of Graves' batteiy which Brown had sent in response to Buckner's call also came thimdering up. In accordance with Buckner"s instructions, the cannoneers unlimbered their two pieces. The gun.s were mounted in the emplacement which had been constructed at the intersection of the new and old defense lines. Observing that Lauman's troops had seized the rifle pits flanking the Eddy ville road. Colonel Cook determined to get permission to commit his brigade. Since General Smith had accompanied the attacking force, he was not readly available. Cook accordingly realized he would have to obtain the necessary sanction from General Grant. A staff" officer was sent to contact Grant and secure the general's permission. Furthermore, Cook wished to attack and capture the enemy's batteries. Porter's and Craves', which had started to rake Lauman's command with canister and shell. While awaiting the return of his messenger. Cook received information indicating the "Stais and Stripes" had been planted on the portion of the Confederate works occupied by Porter's battery. This favorable news caused Cook to order his men to hold their fire. Next, Cook sought to verify the reported captin-e of Porter's position. At the same time. Cook ordered his skii-mishers to rejoin theii-parent units. Within a few minutes, Cook was able to ascertain the "Stars and Stripes" had been raised by the Rebels as a ruse in an effort to deco>' tlie bluecoats into an ambush. **" Shortly thereafter, the staff officer returned with Grant's approval of Cook's proposal to move to Lauman's support. Colonel Cook tlien ordered his brigade forward. By tlois time, the 7th Illinois had reached the front and had taken position on the right of the 50th Ilhnois. In column of battalion, by the left flank. Cook's three attacking regiments, the 12th Iowa on the left, the 50th Illinois in the center, and the 7th Illinois on tlie right, swept forwaid on the double. Surging down off the ridge which sei-ved as their point of depai-ture. Cook's ù-oops crossed the small stream at the bottom. They then began to ascend the abatis-covered opposite slope. Cook's regiments advanced against the left flank of the detached line of rifle pits captured by Lauman's brigade. Therefore, they received no frontal fire. Porter's gtms, which were emplaced in the perimeter's southwestern sahent angle, were 85 Ibid., 870-371. 88 Ibid., 221. able to enfilade the right flank of the attacking columns. Fortunately for the Yankees, the beaten zone was limited; the greyclad gunners consistently overshot their targets. In his "After Action Report," Colonel Cook observed, "The distance being short, the discharges caused but little damage, overshooting us just enough to tear into shreds the colors of the Seventh Illinois . . ." Cook's ti-oops entered the detached enrthworks to the right of where Lauman's brigade had scored its breaktlu-ough. Taking position in the rifle pits. Cook's three regiments prepared to cover Lauman's troops.'*ô
« «
In the meantime, Lauman's brigade, spearheaded b>^ the 2d Iowa, had resumed the advance. Pressing eagerly forward in line of battle, Tuttle's Hawkeyes, their flanks covered by sharpshooters of the 14th Missouri, reached the bottom of the ravine. The Iowans and Missourians began to claw their way up the ridge, on top of wliich the butternuts had re-fonned their lines. In the face of a galling fire, the grim bluecoats slowly worked their way forward. Before Tuttle's ti-oops were able to reach the crest of" the ridge, the greycalds checked their advance. When his men were unable to move any farther in the face of the constantly impacting resistance, Tuttle ordered them to lie down. Hitting the grovmd, the Iowans returned the Confederates' fire.^** On Tuttle's left, the 52d Indiana moved cautiously forward. Evidently, the regimental officei-s had been unable to reorganize their unit which had reached the rifle pits in "confusion." A large number of the Hoosiers refused to advance. Instead of accompanying their comrades, these people took cover in the earthworks. From the rifle pits the Indianians blazed away at tlie Confederates on the opposite ridge. The range, however, was too great. The recently recruited Hoosiers' volleys fell short. At this time, the 2d Iowa was pinned down in front of the Confederates' position. Unfortunately for them-ŝ elves, the Hawkeyes were within range of the Indianians' small-arms. Consequently, the Iowans suffered severely as a result of the "ti-igger happy" Hoosiers' fire. Colonel Tuttle in his "After Action Report" caustically commented:
In die mean time the enemy were being re-enforeed, and one of our regiment poured a disastrous fire upon ui in the rear ... I am not able to name the regiment which fired upon our rear, but I do know that the greater part of the casualties we received at that point was from that source, for I myself saw some of my men fall who I know were shot from the hill behind us.
Dashing up to tlic rifle pits where the Indianians had ensconced themselves. General Smith put a stop to this haphazard firing. Before riding over to anotlier section of the front, Ceneral Smith directed the Hoosiers to remain where they were.' "*"
A portion of the 52d Indiana, supported on the left by a hattalion of the 14th Missouri, had continued the advance in compliance with Smith's instructions. Reaching the bottom of the hollow, tliese two units began to ascend the western slope.L ike the 2d Iowa, to their right, the Hoosiers' and Missourians' quickly found their progress checked by the hard-fighting Confederates.
The 25th Indiana and the 7th Iowa, screened by the otlier hattalion of the 14th Missouri, supported the 2d Iowa's attack on Üie right. Descending the steep slope, the officejs in chcu-ge of tlie two regiments found that their battle lines had become "somewhat broken." At the bottom of the ravine, they halted their units while the men dressed ranks. Before tlie advance could be renewed, the 2d Iowa had started to retire. To cover tlie Hawkeyes' reti-eat, the 25th Indiana and 7th Iowa grimly held their ground in the bottom of the hollow.»"
The Confederate infantiy, ably supported by Porter's and a section of Craves' batteries, had easily checked the Federals' attempt to exploit their initial success. An examination of tlie "After Action Reports" reveals that only one Union regiment, the 2d Iowa, made a determined efibrt to reach Buckner's reorganized hne of resistance. Tuttle's Hawkeyes were stopped short of tlie Rebel line, however. After lying down, the Iowaiis continued to bang away at the butternuts "for over an hom-." Only when he was informed that his men had exhausted their ammunition did Tuttle order tliem to fall back. Before the reüeat of the2d Iowa, additional Confederate units reached the point of danger. The 42d Tennessee came up on the double. Buckner used this regiment to plug a weak spot in his reorganized front between the 2d Kentucky's right and the left of the 3d Tennessee. To help contain the Union peneü-ation. Colonel Head decided to order additional troops from his brigade into action. The colonel sent a messenger to the fort with a dispatch for Colonel Cyrus A. Sugg, who had been left in charge of the garrison upon Colonel Bailey's depaitiu-e. Sugg was directed to have part of his regiment-the 50th Tennessee-reinforce Buckner. Leaving Lieutenant Colonel HaiTison C. Lockhiut in command at the fort, Sugg, accompanied by one battalion, moved out on the double. Arriving at the front, Sugg deployed his battalion on the right of the 49th Tennessee. The newcomers were used to anchor the right flank of Buckner's new defense hne.^-Having succeeded in concenti-ating six regiments (the 2d Kentucky, the 14th Mississippi, the 3d, lSth, 42d, and 49tli Tennessee) and two battahons (Turner's and Sugg's), supported by artillery, along a line which Colonel Hanson pronovmced stronger "than the one lost," the Confederates checked the Union advance."* In fact, the Yankees were unable to hold all the ground gained, in the face of the tremendous firepower displayed by the Confederates. Cmdgingly giving ground, the bluecoats retired across the hollow, taking cover in the captiu-ed rifle pits. Buckner, however, failed to launch a counterattack. The butternuts were denied the chance of exploiting this Federal set back. The reason for this failure can be attributed to two factors; first, Buckner had overestimated the sti-ength of the attac;king Union force, and, second, most of the Confederate troops involved were completely exhausted. All of Buckner's infantry and artillery, except the 49th Tennessee and tlie two battallcns (Sugg's and Turner's), had participated in the morning's attack on the Union right. In his "After Action Report," Major Nat. F. Gheairs, commanding the 3d Tennessee, noted, "Notwithstanding they [his men] were completely ( or nearly so ) worn down by incessant fighting and fatigue duty for eight consecutive days, we succeeded in diiving back the enemy, although they had fresh and we had exhausted troops.'"* The Rebel artilleiy (Porter's battery, a section of Graves' unit, and tlie guns of the fort manned by Ross' and Stanldeuriz's detachments) blasted the oncoming Unionists wth canister, shot, and shell. Lieutenant John W. Morton of Porter's battery dramatically described the Union attack:
Bailey's, Sugg's and Quarles' regiments very soon reenforced tliis new line, and one section of Graves' battery, under the personal diiection of the heroic Graves took position at the intersection of the new with the old lines, and as usual was most conspicuous for its effective work. Morton's section of Porter's battery, which had been delayed In reaching its former position, was promptly tlirown into action to the left of Graves, under a heavy fire. The horses were shot down and the guns run into place by hand. Until dark the desperate conflict raged. Lieutenant [Leverett] Hutchison, of Porter's battery, w;is severely shot tlirough the neck. Lieut. LW. R.] Culbeitson of the same battery, was hit; and the gallant Gapt. Thomas K. Porter, who, Hanson said, "always directed his guns at the right time and to the right place," was disabled by a severe and dangerous wound, and was borne from the field. Capt. Porter's marked coolness and dash, and the efficient • and intelligent manner in which he handled liis guns, elicited the unbounded admiration of all who saw him. While being carried bleeding from the field, he said to me, "Don't let tliem have the gims Morton." I replied, "No, Gaptain; not while I have one man left," little mindful that my apprehensions would be so nearly carried out. Tlie cannoneers had been greatly reduced by frost-bites, wounds and deaths, unrtl toward the close of this engagement I had only tliree men left at one gun. One of diese was wounded and left where he fell, we being unable to remove him at the moment. Pat Kine, acting munber one, who was always at his post, seeing the dead and wounded lying tliick around us, impelled by that generous and gallant nature and impulsive disposition so characteristic of the Irish race, threw himself in front "* Ibid., 333, 351. of me saying: "Lieutenant, Lieutenant, get lower down the hill, or diey will kill you;" and actually embraced me as if to make a shield of himself to the enemy's bullets for my protection.
I replied: "Uo, Pat; let us give them one more round." He promptly seized his rannning stafE and while in the act of driving the eharge home, was shot through die heart and dropped underneadi his gun. Night soon closed the bloody combat.^" Botli General Buckner and Colonel Brown in Ûieiï "After Action Reports" paid tribute to the role of the artillery in checking the Yankees' advance. The general recalled:
During a contest of more than two hours die enemy direatened my left with a heavy column and made repeated attempts to storm my line on the right, but the well-directed fire of Porter's and Graves' artillery and the musketry fire of the infantry repelled the attempts and finally drove liim to seek shelter behind the works he had taken and amid tlie irregularities of the ground.'"' Colonel Brown cited the artilleiy's accomplishments iii stronger terms:
Gaptains Porter and Graves did efficient ser\'iee in die engagement with their batteries; indeed they excited the admiration of the whole command by an exhibitiion ol eoolness and bravery under a heavy fire, from wliieh they had no protection, which could not be excelled. Gaptain Porter fell dangerously wounded by a Minie ball through his tliigh while working one of his gnns, his gumiers beirig nearly all of diem disabled or killed. The command then devolved upon Lieutenant Morton, a beardless youth, who stepped forward like an old veteran, and nobly did he emulate die example of his brave captain. Porter's battery, from its aedve participation in the four-days conflict, its advanced and exposed position, lost eight men kiUed outright and twenty-five wounded, making a total in killed and wounded of ihirty-tliree out of forty-eight officers and men, engaged actively at the guns. The remainder of the company were drivers, teamsters, and artificers, and, widi the horses, were portected in a ravine some distance from the battery. Source Book, 1358.
tecüon afforded by these earthworks, the bluecoats returned the Confederates' fire. Shortly after his Iowans had regained the works. Colonel Tuttle was injured when a projectile from one of the Confederate cannons stiiick the log on which he was standing. The impact knocked the colonel to the groim.d, injuring his back and spraining his wrist. With Colonel Tuttle out of action. Colonel Baker assumed command of the regiment.^* The 25th Indiana and the 7th Iowa held their position in the bottom of the ravine until after the 2d Iowa and the 14th Missoini had l^eached the rifle pits. Having successfully covered theii-comrades' reti-eat, the Hawkeyes and Hoosiers, keeping tlieii-faces toward the foe, slowly retraced their steps. Reacliing the earthworks, these two regiments took position on the right of the 2d Iowa. Mustering his unit, the 25th Indiana, Colonel Veatch found the attack had cost his command 40 men, all wounded.'" After his division had failed to caiiy Üie Confederates' reorganized main line of resistance, Ceneral Sinith ordered his brigade commanders, Launian and Cook, to hold the captin-ed rifle pits. As soon as Lauman's tioops had fallen back into the earthworks they were redeployed from left to right: the 2d Iowa, the 25th Indiana, the 7th Iowa, the 14th Missouri, and tlie 14th Iowa. Colonel Shaw's 14th Iowa continued to support Lieutenant O'Connell's two 10-pounder Parrotts. The hapless 52d Indiana was pulled out of the line by Ceneral Smith. Once Colonel James M. Smith had mustered and re-formed his regiment, he rejoined liis parent brigade. Cook's.i"" When Captain Newsham reached the front with Lieutenant O'ConneU's PaiTOtts, Ceneral Smith told him that "the guns were too ught." The general urged the staff officer to procure some heavier ordnance. Retimiing to the Ridge road. Captain Newsham encountered Battery H, 1st Missouri Light Artillery. At this time, Üie Missouri artillerists were en route from the Union right. The battery was under orders to furnish fii-e support to Smith's command. Hailing the battery "^ O.R., Sedes I, Vol. VII, [229] [230] Roster and Record of Iowa Soldiers commander. Captain Welker, Newsham directed him to report to Ceneral Smith. Following the receipt of these instructions, tlie cannoneers eased their three guns (two 20-pounders and one 10-pounder Parrott rifles) cautiousl)-off the ridge where Smith's division had formed before the attack. Caining the Eddyville road, the gunners drove tlieii-teams up the opposite slope. Reaching the rifle pits. Captain Welker's cannoneers unlimbered their three pieces on the left of O'Connell's section. Their guns placed in battery, the Missomians began to ti-ade shots with the Confederate field pieces emplaced on the opposite side of the hollow. During the ensumg duel, O'Connell's section beat Welker's gunners to the punch and dismounted one of the butternuts' guns.'" Colonel Cook's brigade occupied the section of the captured earthworks on Lauman's right. Shortly before the 2d Iowa was compelled to give way, Ceneral Smith had ridden up to Colonel Babcock's command post. Evidently, the general had witnessed the advance of the 7th Illinois. As Historian Ambrose remembered, the general called to Colonel Babcock: I never saw a regiment make such grand movements under such a fire in all my military life as your's has just made. Colonel, I thank God for your eommand at this moment. Charge that rebel battery! charge it with your steel and silence its work of death! Accordingly, Colonel Babcock hastily formed his regiment into line of battle. But before the colonel could lead his men in an attack on Porter's battery, the general glanced toward the west. Observing tliat the sun was about to drop below the horizon, Ceneral Smith tinned to Babcock and remaiked, "I countermand the order given you to charge that batteiy. It is now too late; I will leave that work for you to do tomor-
w.
In addition to the 52d Indiana, tlie 13th Missouri, which had been supporting the four guns emplaced on the ridge southwest of the Poor house, was also directed to repoit to Colonel Cook. By dusk, the Missourians had rejoined Cook's brigade. The rifle pits occupied by Cook's command were not extensive. To keep from crowding his men into a limited ini Source Book, 936; O.R., Series I, Vol. VII, 226; O.K., Series I, Vol. LII, pt. I, 9, 13. space, Cook decided to hold a portion of his brigade in reserve. The three regiments already ensconced in the earthworks-the 7th and 50th Illinois, and the 12th Jowa-would remain where they were, while the 52d Indiana and the 13th Missouri spent the night on the timber-strewn western slope of the ridge.i"B efore retm-ning to the front after contacting Batteiy H, Captain Newsham encountered Ceneral Crant. The general asked Newsham if "Smith wanted anything." Without having been given the authority by General Smith, the captain replied that the general "wanted some of his old regiments." Without a moment's hesitation Grant issued instiaictions for Captain Rawlins to proceed to the right flank of the army. On his arrival in that area Rawlins was to order Colonel John McAithtir's brigade to report to General Smith.^"M cArthur's brigade had been badly battered dm-ing the Confederate attack on the Union right. The brigade had been withdrawn into the upper reaches of Bufford Hollow. Here the troops had halted. The rolls were called and the command supplied with rations and ammunition. By 4 p.m. when RawHns rode up, these tasks had been completed. McAi-thur was ready to redeploy his brigade. After Rawlins had explained Grant's order to McArthur, the brigade moved out-the 12th Illinois in tlie van. Darkness had fallen and the day's fighting had ceased by the time McAithur's haixl-marching troops reached tlie hollow south of James Crisp's house.
Before proceeding any farther, McArthur stopped his command. A staff officer was sent to acquaint General Smith with the brigade's arrival. The aide soon returned with the necessaiy instructions. McArthur \\'as directed to send one of his regiments to the front; the other two would constitute Smith's sti-ategic reserve and camp in the hollow. McAi-thm-assigned to the 12tli Illinois the mission of bolstering Smith's main line of resistance.
Greatly hindered by the dai'kness, the Illinoisans scaled the abads-covered slope and gained the captm^ed rifle pits. When tlie 12th Illinois reported to General Smith, he ordered the unit into position on the left of the 2d Iowa. After being reorganized and replenishing their ammunition in Bufford Hollow, Wallace's troops were again deployed into line of battle. Taking position on the right of Thayer's brigade, Wallace's bluecoats had helped check the Rebels' advance. Once the greyclads had begun to retire into their earthworks, Wallace received a message from Grant. According to these instructions, Wallace was to move his brigade to the left "so as to be within easy supporting distance of either wing" of the army. Quickly assembling his command, Wallace proceeded to implement the general's orders. Giossing the valley of Indian Greek, Wallace's troops took position on the ridge southwest of the Poor house. It was on this ridge that Lew Wallace had formed his division less than 12 hours before."« The section of guns belonging to Batteiy D, 1st Missouri Light Artillery, which had been ordered to the Wyniis Ferr>' road sector during the afternoon, was also directed to rejoin General Smith. Without having fired a single projectile, the Missourians retraced their steps, camping for the night near the Ridge road."'
The presence of W.H.L. Wallace's troops served to alarm the Gonfederates. They were afraid the Yankee generals were going to use these men to laimch an attack on the sector of the Fort Donelson perimeter between the southwestern salient angle and Indian Greek. At tliis time, (just before dark) these rifle pits were held by two regiments-the 32d and 4]st Tennessee-and a battalion of the 30th Tennessee. In their "After Action Reports" both General Buckner and Golonel Edward G. Gook of the 32d Tennessee commented on Wallace's concentration. The general pointed out that "the enemy tlireatened" his left, while Cook stated "the enemy appeared in large force in front of us and threatened to attack us, when night came on."^"'' When the news of the Union breakthrough reached Confederate GHQ, General Floyd issued instnictions for Colonel John M. Simonton's brigade to hasten to Buckner's aid. At tlie time these instructions reached Colonel Simonton's command post, his unit was reoccupying the rifle pits adjacent to the Forge road. The troops were ordered to fall in; the brigade moved off' on tlie double. Before Simonton's men reached the point of danger, Buckner's troops had contained the Union penetration. Furthermore, Colonel Joseph Drake's command had been unable to check Lew Wallace's advance on the Confederate left. Consequently, Floyd countermanded his order to Simton. The now thoroughly confused troops of Simonton's brigade retraced their steps.^''" fl « ft
Once darkness had put a stop to the day's hostilities. General Smitli inspected and approved the dispositions made by Cook and Lauman. In accordance with the general's instructions the brigade commanders had covered their respective fronts with a sti'ong line of outposts. Before retiring to his headquarters on the opposite ridge, the general told Cook and Lauman "to hold the position obtained dmûng the night and immediately prepare for a combined assault the following morning."^ ^°L auman told the general, "That we could hold it till doomsday.""! Reaching the bottom of the hollow west of the captured rifle pits. Smith sighted "a regiment drawn up in hne of battle Nvith about 50 men with bandages on their arms and legs." Turning to Captain Newsham, the general inquired the regiment's designation. Newsham replied the 9th IUinois. Smith then asked "what those white bandages were on the men for?" The captain answered "they were on men who when they heard that he wanted them had left the field hospital and joined the regiment to do and die for him." By this time "8 Ibid., 333, 357. 
